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The Pungent Smell of “Red Herrings”: 





Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) provide cross-country evidence that the resource curse is a 
“red herring” once one corrects for endogeneity of resource exports and allows resource 
abundance affect growth. Their results show that resource exports are no longer significant 
while the value of subsoil assets has a significant positive effect on growth. But the World 
Bank measure of subsoil assets is proportional to current rents, and thus also endogenous. 
Furthermore, their results suffer from an unfortunate data mishap, omitted variables bias, 
weakness of the instruments, violation of exclusion restrictions and misspecification error. 
Correcting for these issues and instrumenting resource exports with values of proven reserves 
at the beginning of the sample period; there is no evidence for the resource curse either and 
subsoil assets are no longer significant. However, the same evidence suggests that resource 
exports or rents boost growth in stable countries, but also make especially already volatile 
countries more volatile and thus indirectly worsen growth prospects. Ignoring the volatility 
channel, may lead one to erroneously conclude that there is no effect of resources on growth. 
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1.  Introduction 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008ab), from now on referred to as BB, argue that the resource 
curse popularized by the cross-country study of Sachs and Warner (1997)
1 is a “red herring”.
2 
3 
This is a bold claim given the huge literature on the potential adverse effects of natural resources 
on growth. Interestingly, BB base their critique on the endogeneity of resource dependency, 
measured by resource exports. It is, after all, reasonable to conjecture that resource exports 
themselves may be affected by the growth rate of the economy. To overcome the problem, trade 
openness and a presidential system dummy are put forward as instruments for resource exports. 
Natural capital as estimated by World Bank (2006a) is used to give the value of subsoil assets. 
Re-estimation then shows that resource dependence has no significant effect on growth whereas 
resource abundance, measured by subsoil assets, has a significant positive effect on the growth 
rate. Hence, BB conjecture in their influential study that the curse is a “red herring”. 
However, examining the data for the value of subsoil assets that have been used to shed 
doubt on the resource curse
4, it becomes apparent that these data are proportional to resource 
rents. Although the factor of proportionality varies with the ratio of reserves to current 
production, this is not the case for those resources for which reserves data are missing. World 
Bank (2006a) made the strong assumption for their 1994 data that natural resources for which 
reserves data are missing −  regardless of where they are, what type they are and what date it is − 
                                                            
1 See also Mehlum et al. (2006), Boschini et al. (2007) and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) for empirical 
evidence on the natural resource curse. 
2 A “red herring”, often used in mystery novels, diverts attention from the truth about, say, the identity of the guilty 
party. The “red herring” is a preserved fish with brownish color and pungent smell. One etymology is that it was 
used in the training of scent hounds and also to deflect attention from the smell of a fox or badger. Another 
(unlikely) reading is that escaped convicts would throw “red herrings” to confuse the dogs chasing them. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/) 
3 Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) also argue that the detrimental effect of natural resources on war and conflict 
established and further evaluated by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004, 2005), Reynal-Querol (2002), Ross (2004), 
Ron(2005) and Fearon (2005) among others, is also a “red herring”. 
4 Ding and Field (2005) and Alexeev and Conrad (2009) also find that, if natural resource abundance is used rather 
than natural resource dependence, a positive effect on growth is found. These studies also seem to appear to confuse 
natural resource abundance with natural resource rents. 2 
 
last a further 20 years. For their 2000 data the World Bank assumed all reserves last 20 years. 
This may make sense to get a one-off cross-country estimate of natural capital and net adjusted 
saving, but not to get a cross-country or panel dataset of subsoil wealth. If the effect of resource 
exports on growth is insignificant and that of subsoil assets is positive and significant, one might 
conclude that there is no curse  
To tackle the intricate issue of endogeneity of natural resource exports and the quality of 
institutions, BB instrument natural resource exports with average openness and a presidential 
system dummy and instrument the quality of institutions with latitude. However, their analysis is 
based on too stringent assumptions that preclude direct interpretation of the results. One problem 
is that BB accidentally used GDP per capita based on current rather than constant (1996) 
international dollars. Although BB include all exogenous variables in both stages of IV 
regressions for economic growth in preliminary regressions instrumenting one endogenous 
variable at a time (presented in their Table 4), they omit several exogenous variables in the first 
stages of their more important robustness exercises when all endogenous variables are 
instrumented at once (presented in their Table 5). The latter generally yield inconsistent 
estimates. Openness and a presidential system dummy as (weak) instruments for natural resource 
exports give noisy estimates of resource exports and an insignificant coefficient on the predicted 
value of resource exports in the second stage. BB also use institutional quality in both the first- 
and the second-stage IV regressions, which leads to misspecification of the IV regressions if 
institutional quality is endogenous. Furthermore, weakness of the instruments leads to biased 
estimates (i.e., a bias towards the OLS estimates). Apart from these issues with appropriate use 
of instrumental variables, the second-stage regressions may suffer from omitted variables bias as 
average saving or investment rates, schooling, openness, and population growth do not feature in 3 
 
the second stage. The assumption that the effect of several standard growth determinants is 
neglible is very restrictive a priori.
5 The standard errors which they report for the second stage 
may be too small, so that natural resource exports may be more significant than is suggested. 
Also, the estimated value of subsoil assets is closely related to resource rents and thus is thus also 
endogenous. This begs the question why subsoil assets themselves are not instrumented. 
The objective of this comment is twofold. First, we highlight the strong assumptions 
behind the World Bank (2006a) measures of natural capital. Second, we examine whether the 
resource curse is indeed a “red herring” and whether the value of subsoil assets is a blessing for 
growth as suggested by BB. We therefore re-estimate their IV regressions while relaxing several 
assumptions. We make sure to use the full range of exogenous variables, obey the exclusion 
restriction, avoid omitted variables bias in the second stage, and correct the standard errors. We 
believe openness and a presidential system dummy are weak instruments for natural resource 
exports (or rents), hence we use not yet extracted reserves per capita from Norman (2009) as an 
alternative instrument that should not affect growth directly. These data are more exogenous than 
natural capital data, but relate to economically recoverable reserves and depend on the price of 
resources and the state of technology. Although they are not completely exogenous, it is random 
whether a country has resource in the ground or not and this should not affect the rate of 
economic growth directly. Openness can then also be a potential determinant of growth in the 
second stage.  
We confirm that there is no negative significant effect of initial resource exports on 
growth. We offer weak evidence that the long-run average of resource exports and rents have 
negative effects on growth, but these effects are not robust. When using Norman’s (2009) direct 
                                                            
5 Although BB argue that their results are robust to including some of these additional regressors, it may still be the 
case that the results are inconsistent if these are also left out of the first stages.  4 
 
measure of reserves as an alternative instrument instead of openness and the residential dummy, 
we find no evidence for either a curse or blessing.  
Section 2 describes how the World Bank calculates its estimates of the value of subsoil assets 
and demonstrates that these data are closely related to resource rents. Section 3 criticizes the use 
of these data as an explanatory variable. Section 4 re-estimates the effect of resources on growth 
paying careful attention to the econometric specification, using reserves as instrument for 
resource exports and the value of subsoil assets, and using data from more recent Penn World 
Tables. The results confirm there is no evidence neither for a curse or blessing of resource 
exports, nor of subsoil assets. However, section 5 offers evidence that the negative indirect effect 
via volatility seems to wipe out the direct effect of resource dependence. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  How is the World Bank measure of natural capital constructed? 
It is hard to estimate the value of energy and mineral resources. First, the importance of the value 
of resources in national accounting has only recently been recognized, and most efforts to 
estimate these values are undertaken by international organizations rather than countries 
themselves. Second, there are no private markets for subsoil resource deposits which can convey 
information on the value of reserves. Third, reserves are only those that are economically viable 
to produce and thus depend on the prevalent price of resources and cost of extraction. Still, 
World Bank (2006a) assigns dollar values to stocks of hydrocarbon energy using data from the 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy and stocks of bauxite, copper, gold, iron, ore, lead, 
nickel, phosphate rock, silver, tin and zinc where production figures are available.  
For a particular country and resource, we define the value of assets as present value of 
rents 
1









≡+ ∑ where πi is rent per unit of resource production and qi production 5 
 
at time i, r* the growth-corrected social discount rate, and Tt remaining lifetime of the resource 
measured from time t. Since future rents are unknown, World Bank (2006a) assumes that unit 
resource rents grow at rate  () () // 11 1 ,
t T
gr r ππ ε ⎡ ⎤ ≡=+ − + ⎣ ⎦
&  where ε = 1.15 is the elasticity of 
the cost function, as in Vincent (1997), and r is the social discount rate. Appendix 1 explains the 
necessary assumptions. With a growth-corrected discount rate r* = (r−g)/(1+g), resource wealth 
at any point of time is proportional to resource rents 
1
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 The factor 
of proportionality is smaller if the remaining lifetime of the resource is less, the growth rate of 
natural resource rents is smaller or the social discount rate is bigger.  
Lifetime years of a resource can be calculated as the ratio of reserves to current 
production. World Bank (2006a, appendix 1) reports median lifetime years for oil, gas, hard coal 
and soft coal of 17, 36, 122 and 192 years, respectively, and for bauxite, copper, gold, iron ore, 
lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, silver and zinc of 178, 38, 16, 133, 18, 27, 28, 28, 22 and 17 years, 
respectively.
6 With the exception of coal, bauxite and iron which are very abundant, the median 
reserves-to-production ratios are around 20 to 30 years. To overcome the practical problem of 
missing data, World Bank (2006a) takes a pragmatic approach and chooses a smaller value of T 
= 20 for all resources and all countries despite lifetime years differing by resource, country, and 
date, even though a gold mine may have only 15 years left in 2000 and thus only 10 years left in 
2005. And no allowance is made for very large lifetimes of coal, bauxite and iron and for the 
specifics of some countries and some resources. World Bank (2006a) argues that extending the 
lifetime beyond 20 years should not matter that much, as future rents are more heavily 
                                                            
6 Estimates of natural capital for timber resources, non-timber forest resources, cropland, pastureland and protected 
areas are also given, but as the resource curse is often said to be especially acute for point-based resources (e.g., 
Boschini, et al., 2007), we focus on the subcategory subsoil wealth. 6 
 
discounted. Furthermore, uncertainty increases with longer lifetimes and it may be prudent not to 
weigh distant rents too much. 
With a lifetime of 20 years and a social discount rate of r = 0.04, we have T = 20, g = 
0.03, (1+r)/(r−g) = 104 and Vt = 18.3 πt qt. The value of sub-soil assets for 2000 calculated by 
World Bank (2006a) is thus simply 18.3 times current natural resource rents.
7 This ratio is 
relatively constant as the time horizon of the resource is changed. It increases from 14 times 
natural resource rents for a lifetime of 15 years to 32.3 for a lifetime of 58 years, and thereafter 
the ratio of sub-soil asset value to current rents gradually declines to 26 (i.e., (1+r)/r). With a 
lifetime more relevant for coal or bauxite, say 175 years, we have a ratio of 26.2 (which is 
unrealistically low). Doubling the life to 40 years increases the ratio of the value of subsoil assets 
to 31.9, which is less than double. With a longer lifespan of the resource, costs of extraction rise 
substantially and so the growth rate of resource rents falls (and tapers off to zero for extremely 
long lifetimes). Consequently, the growth-corrected social discount rate is higher which reduces 
the value of sub-soil assets. The other effect is due to the truncation term  1( 1 * )
t T r
− ⎡ ⎤ −+ ⎣ ⎦ , which 
rises as the lifetime Tt increases. If the escalation-of-cost effect dominates the truncation effect, 
higher lifetimes lower the ratio of value of subsoil assets to current rents. This occurs for Tt > 58.  
The ratio of sub-soil asset value to current rents is quite sensitive to the choice of social 
discount rate; the ratio being higher for higher real interest rates. The well-known Keynes-
Ramsey rule suggests to use a social discount rate given by r = ρ + η gC, where gC denotes 
growth of consumption, ρ the rate of time preference, and η the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion or the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. With ρ = 0.02, η = 2/3 and 
                                                            
7 World Bank (1997) calculates the value of subsoil assets for 1994 in a similar way using average resource rents for 
the period 1990-94 with again the assumption of a social discount rate of 4 percent per annum and a common 
lifetime of 20 years for all natural resources for which reserves and production data is missing. 7 
 
gC = 0.03, we obtain r = 0.04. More realistic is to give fast-growing developing economies a 
higher social discount rate and declining economies a lower social rate of discount, but that has 
not been done. Resource exporters typically experience low long-run growth rates, which 
suggests that a low social discount rate of 2 rather than, say, 6 percent is more realistic. The ratio 
of subsoil assets to current rents is then about three times as high. Furthermore, we note that a 
smaller curvature of the cost function (lower ε) leads to a higher ratio of the value of subsoil 
assets to rents across the range of lifetimes, especially in the range 50-90 years. 
 
3.  Can natural capital and subsoil assets be viewed as exogenous? 
Section 2 and appendix 1 indicate that it is hazardous to use the natural capital data of the World 
Bank as a cross-country or panel data set. These measures of natural capital assume the same 
social discount rate of 4 percent per annum independent of whether a country grows fast or slow. 
Our discussion in section 2 suggests that resource-rich fragile states with low or even negative 
rates of growth should employ a lower discount rate and thus a higher ratio of subsoil wealth to 
resource rents, but this only holds on optimal consumption-saving paths. In practice, politicians 
in such countries tend to be shortsighted, suggesting a lower ratio. For fast-growing countries 
like China the ratio would be lower. Furthermore, the 2000 measures of natural capital and the 
1994 measures only for those cases where reserve data are missing assume the same remaining 
lifetime of the resource of 20 years and the same elasticity of the cost of extraction, regardless of 
type of resource, country concerned and calendar date. Appendix 1 points out that calculations of 
current rents in World Bank (2006a) are based on a dated estimate of the cost function for 
Malaysian oil fields in World Bank (1992) and used by Vincent (1997). These calculations are an 
approximation and tend to over-estimate marginal costs of extraction and thus under-estimate 8 
 
resource rents and reserves. The same curvature of the cost function and erroneous calculation is 
applied to all energy and mineral resources regardless of where production takes place.  
For those resources for which data are missing, the World Bank measures of natural capital 
are 18.3 times resource rents, regardless of the type of the resource, the country concerned and 
the date. Also, the price of natural resources is assumed to be exogenous, so no allowance is 
made for market power. Since measures of subsoil wealth are proportional or closely related to 
resource rents and rents depend on growth in income per capita and are thus endogenous, subsoil 
wealth is endogenous as well and should thus be instrumented. 
We thus re-examine the evidence for the resource curse using Norman’s (2009) reserves data. 
The index of reserves measures the 1970 value of 35 commodities using reserves data from a 
combination of reports by the US Geological Survey and the US Energy Information Agency.
8 
Reserves are measured as the latest (2002) observed level of reserves
9 plus total production 
during the years preceding the estimate of reserves to capture as closely as possible actual 
subsoil stocks, even if they are partly discovered in later years or only deemed profitably 
extractable in later years. This yields the broadest available measure of reserves. Taking only 
1970 reserves would have underestimated actual and reasonably expected reserves and limited 
country coverage. Even though fast-growing countries may have relatively more reserves due to 
better discovery and extraction technology, it is still essentially random whether a country has 
resources in the ground. Furthermore, in the ground reserves should not affect growth directly. 
                                                            
8 These are: antimony, barite, aluminum, bismuth, boron, chromium, cobalt, columbium, copper, industrial diamond, 
fluorspar, gold, graphite, iodine, iron, lead, lithium, manganese, mercury, molybdenum, nickel, perlite, phosphate 
rock, platinum group metals, potash, silver, talc/pyrophyllite, tantalum, tin, titanium concentrate (ilmanite), titanium 
concentrate (rutile), tungsten, vanadium, zinc and zirconium. 
9 Including deposits considered worth extracting at current prices and extraction costs, and reserves that have 
potential to become economically available within planning horizons.  9 
 
Although this measure is somewhat endogenous, we suspect it is much less so than resource 
rents or the World Bank measures of the value of subsoil assets. 
 
4.  Re-examining the natural resource curse with data on subsoil assets 
The BB data are described in Appendix 2. One problem, as pointed out in detail in sections 2 and 
3, is that their proposed measure of resource abundance, log subsoil 2000 taken from World 
Bank (2006a), is not exogenous. In any case, they do not use it as an exogenous instrument but 
as an additional exogenous regressor in the growth regression. They use average openness for the 
period 1950-60 and a presidential system dummy for 1970 as instruments for mineral exports 
and use latitude as instrument for institutional quality (rule of law or government effectiveness). 
They also use the log of hydrocarbon reserves per capita for 1993 taken from Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003)
10 and also the log fuel and non-fuel mineral per-capita stocks taken from 
Norman (2009). If the latter data are the best reserves variable in the sense of suffering least from 
the problem of endogeneity, then their regressions 5 and 6 of Table 5 are their best estimates. 
Their data allows us to exactly reproduce their results.
11 However, regression 1 in Table 1 below 
reproduces their regression 5 with GDP per capita based on constant (1996) rather than current 
international dollars.
12 On the basis of these 3SLS estimates, it seems at first blush that the 
resource curse is a “red herring” and that, if anything, non-fuel mineral per capita stocks have a 
positive effect on growth, although the equation is unable to explain growth overall. 
However, one can also comment on these 3SLS estimates. First, the 3SLS growth regressions 
suffer from omitted variables bias as usual determinants of growth (average saving or investment 
                                                            
10 These are the log of total BTUs per person of proven crude oil and natural gas reserves in 1993 in WRI (1996). 
11 The data was kindly provided to us by the authors. 
12 Using the Penn World Tables 6.1 series rgdpch instead of cgdp. We will use rgdpch throughout this paper. For the 
Penn World Tables 6.2 the base year is 2000. Over the sample period 1970-2000 the annual growth rates in rgdpch 
and cgdp are, respectively, 5.8% and 1.5% per annum. 10 
 
rates, schooling, openness, or population growth) do not feature in these regressions. Our 
estimates yield a rate of convergence of −ln(0.647)/30 = 1.45% per year, but the standard error is 
large. 
 Openness could not be used as a determinant of growth, since it was already used as an 
instrument for mineral exports. This issue may be particularly troublesome for 3SLS estimation, 
because 3SLS is sensitive to the assumed exclusion restrictions in each equation. If only one is 
invalid (i.e., if initial income does affect the rule of law) then all other parameters in each 
equation are generally inconsistent. In addition, their 3SLS regressions assume homoskedastic 
errors. We believe that the robustness of 2SLS estimation is more important for achieving 
consistent results than the possible efficiency gains of 3SLS in a cross-country growth setting. 
Second, the variable lgdp70, which is assumed to be exogenous in the second-stage growth 
regressions, is not included in the first-stages of the 3SLS regressions. This omission will 
generally lead to inconsistent results due to correlation between the first stage error and the 
omitted variable. Third, 2SLS first-stage excluded F-tests suggest that the instruments 
underidentify the instrumented variables, which leads to biased estimates (i.e., a bias towards the 
OLS estimates). Actual proven reserves rather than the value of subsoil wealth based on rents 
ought to be a good instrument for resource exports whereas it should not have a direct effect on 
growth performance. Fourth, the Shea's partial R2 is reported to be 0.43 which implies noisy 
2SLS first-stage estimates, leading to inflation of the second-stage standard errors by 0.43
-0.5 = 
1.5 (Shea, 1997). This may mean that the mineral exports variable minxp7080s is much more 
significant than is suggested. Fifth, in the 2SLS regressions institutions are included in the 
second stage but are also included in the first-stage regressions for resource dependence. 
However, if institutions are endogenous and some assumed exclusion restrictions are violated, 11 
 
than the first-stage regressions for resource dependence are misspecified.  
We therefore re-estimate the IV regressions with the following changes: 
•  To avoid misspecification, institutional quality and openness are not used as instruments 
in the first stage of the IV regressions as they are potential determinants of growth 
performance in the second stage. This also helps to avoid the pitfall of omitted variables 
bias in the second-stage IV regressions. We focus on 2SLS results, rather than 3SLS 
regressions. The latter are less robust to misspecification of the first stages which may be 
more important than possible potential efficiency gains from 3SLS regression.  
•  To further avoid omitted variables bias, population growth, average saving or investment 
rates and schooling levels are added to institutional quality and initial GDP per capita as 
potential determinants of economic growth in the second-stage IV regressions.  
•  Resource exports (minxp) are instrumented with reserves, and a presidential system 
dummy.
 13 Institutional quality is still instrumented with latitude. To avoid inconsistent 
estimates, we also include all the other exogenous variables in the second stage (i.e., 
openness, lgdp70, population growth, average investment rates and schooling levels. We 
thus project each of the potentially endogenous regressors on the full set of exogenous 
variables and use this as the regressor for the second stage. Additionally, we update the 
data with a more recent version (6.2) of the Penn World Tables. 
As discussed at the end of section 3, reserves are measured at the beginning of the sample period 
in 1970 to avoid the problem of endogeneity of reserves. Table 1 reports the results of our IV 
regressions.  
Regressions 1 reproduce the 3SLS specification of BB, their Table 5, column 5, which 
                                                            
13 Minxp refers to the variable used by BB, which is defined as average resource exports over GDP between 1970 
and 1989. When we change the period we also change the name to natpoint in order to clearly distinguish new 
variables from variables used in BB.  12 
 
has non-robust standard errors.
14 This specification suggests an insignificant but positive effect 
of mineral exports on the growth rate of the economy.  
Table 1: IV estimates for the effect of natural resources on growth 



















 dependent variable  minxp 
7080s  rule 1996  g7000  natpoint 
70 
rule 
1996  g7000  natpoint 
7000  g7000  lsubsoil 
1994  g7000 
   0.998 1.400 ‐0.933    Instrumented resource 
dependence  
(definition changes) 
   (0.916) (0.947) (1.115)   
         ‐0.008 Instrumented resource 
stock based on rents                   (0.035) 
rule 1996  ‐0.010   0.554*     0.421         
  (0.017)   (0.283)    (0.270)         
rule 1984       0.003 0.064  0.450***  0.123**
       (0.006) (0.044)  (0.136)  (0.058)
open5060s  0.209***     0.233*** 0.046  ‐0.253  0.159***  0.041  0.186  ‐0.390 
  (0.033)     (0.077)  (0.273)  (0.243)  (0.034)  (0.150)  (0.832)  (0.264) 
lgdp70     ‐ 0.353  0.042  0.267  ‐0.628*** ‐0.004  ‐0.499***  ‐0.051  ‐0.525***
     (0.215) (0.033) (0.201) (0.183) (0.014) (0.084)  (0.267)  (0.093)
invgdp7000       ‐ 0.000 0.012 0.030*** ‐0.001 0.036***  ‐0.011  0.023**
       (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.030)  (0.011) 
human70       ‐ 0.027*** 0.111*  ‐0.005  ‐0.006  0.027  ‐0.092  0.014 
       (0.010)  (0.065)  (0.057)  (0.005)  (0.025)  (0.108)  (0.025) 
gpop7000       ‐ 0.064 ‐0.128 ‐0.437* ‐0.048 ‐0.720***  ‐0.350  ‐0.856***
       (0.039) (0.246) (0.250) (0.056) (0.213)  (1.151)  (0.291)
Instruments:                    
pres70s  0.066***    0.010 ‐ 0.016    0.046***    0.431   
  (0.024)     (0.035)  (0.184)    (0.015)    (0.370)   
lallminpc   0.016*** 0.034  0.004 0.019*** ‐0.009 0.014***   0.753*** 
('mineral abundance')  (0.003) (0.023)  (0.022) (0.005) (0.030) (0.004)   (0.107) 
latitude    2.449***   0.014  1.544**          
    (0.552)  (0.083)  (0.581)           
Constant  0.023  0.620  2.994* ‐ 0.097 ‐ 2.849* 5.596***  0.135  4.172***  9.836***  4.726***
  (0.062) (0.521)  (1.757) (0.213) (1.521) (1.412) (0.119) (0.624)  (2.579)  (0.601)
Observations/Countries  82  82  82 61 61 61 66 66  50  50




         0.497    0.537    0.862 
Kleibergen-Paap F-test  
statistic (robust) 
         2.413  9.185    25.083   
Shea's Partial R2       0.271  0.124   0.368    0.598   
1st stage excluded  
F-test (non-robust) 
     5.986  2.888          
Standard errors in parentheses, robust to heteroskedasticity in regressions (2), (3) and (4). Regressions (1) and (2) include BB regional 
dummies, but they were excluded in regressions (3) and (4) because they were jointly insignificant. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
                                                            
14 For reasons of space and clarity, we only use rule of law as a proxy of institutions and not also government 
effectiveness. The core 3SLS estimates of the core regression of BB with real GDP per capita growth evaluated at 
current rather than constant international dollars are 3.666 Instrumented Resource dependence + 2.774** rule 1996 
− 1.604* lgdp70 + 0.055 lalmincp + 15.786** constant, 84 Observations/countries, R-Squared = 0.333. 13 
 
2SLS regressions 2 incorporate several improvements to the specification. First of all, 
average natural resource exports between 1970 and 1989 (minxp) is replaced with resource 
exports in 1970 (natpoint70) because initial period characteristics suffer less from reverse 
causality concerns than average period resource dependence, and mineral abundance (lallminpc) 
as captured by the 1970 stock of reserves per capita is now used as an excluded instrument along 
with the presidential dummy (pres70s) and latitude. Moreover, we include several previously 
omitted variables such as the average investment intensity between 1970 and 2000 (invgdp7000), 
initial schooling (human70) and average population growth between 1970 and 2000 (gpop7000) 
and we let openness (open5060s) affect growth directly. Also rule of law in 1996 (rule) no longer 
enters the first stage for resource exports because it is endogenous. 
Even though the instruments are exogenous (see the high p-value of the Hansen J test statistic 
which is robust to heteroskedasticity), we still see that the first stages are underidentified. The 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) F-statistic is far below 10, which means that the IV estimates have a bias 
of over 30% towards the corresponding OLS coefficient (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
15 Even the F-
test by first stage on the excluded instruments are very small (unlike the Kleibergen-Paap 
statistic they are not robust to heteroskedasticity and do not take into account the correlation 
among instruments across the first stages) and suggest that especially latitude as an instrument 
for rule of law performs poorly. We therefore gain little from instrumenting, yielding the 
inconsistent result that resource exports have a weakly significant positive effect on growth.
16 
In regressions 3 we also update the data with more recent Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et 
al., 2006) and replace initial resource exports with the average over 30 years (natpoint7000). For 
                                                            
15 The Kleibergen-Paap statistic is uses the same critical values as the Cragg-Donald (1993) statistic. The latter 
assumes i.i.d. errors, while the former is more general.  
16 The effect, if taken at face value, is rather large: a one standard deviation increase in resource dependence (9.8%) 
supposedly leads to a bonus of 0.46% additional annual growth.  14 
 
lack of a good instrument for rule of law, we replace rule of law in 1996 with rule of law in 1984 
to limit reverse causality as much as possible. Latitude is consequently no longer included in the 
first stage for resource exports. The diagnostic statistics are now much more favorable. The 
instruments are exogenous according to the Hansen test and although the instruments are not 
perfect, they predict resource exports much better as suggested by the Kleibergen-Paap statistics, 
which means that the bias has halved with respect to regressions 2 and 3 in BB table 4.
17 
Population growth is now also significant. We estimate a convergence rate of −ln(0.501)/30 = 
2.30% per year, which implies 30 years to halve the gap. Resource exports do not significantly 
affect growth. The sign points in the direction of a curse, but the standard error is large.
18  
Regressions 4 also look at subsoil assets (based on rents, from BB) as a measure of a 
country's endowment of natural resources. This time we assume that it is endogenous for reasons 
explained before and instrument it with reserves. The model works rather well judging from the 
very good Kleibergen-Paap F statistic
19 and the overidentification test. We can therefore safely 
conclude that subsoil assets have no effect on growth.  
 
5.  Unscrambling the “red herring”: Volatility and the resource curse 
In van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) we offer support for an indirect effect of natural 
resources on growth via the volatility channel. To put this thesis to the test whilst allowing for 
endogeneity of mineral resource exports taking account of the critiques discussed above, we 
estimate IV regressions for yearly growth in GDP per capita and volatility of unanticipated 
                                                            
17 The critical value above which the bias towards the OLS equivalent is less than 10% is for this case 19.93, and 
11.59 for 15% bias (Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
18 If the effect were significant, a one standard deviation increase in resource dependence (7.7%) would lead to a cut 
of 0.24% growth per annum.  
19 The critical value above which the bias is less than 10% is 19.93 for this case.  15 
 
output growth. Using a dataset with N countries and a sample of T years, we estimate a three-
equation econometric model for growth in GDP per capita: 
(1)       70 70 70 ˆ log( ) , it i i i i it yr λσμ ε Δ= + + + + X θ Z β   
2 (0, ), 1,.., , 1,.., . it i Ni N t T εσ ==    
(2)            
2
70 70 ˆ exp( ) ii i rc σν =+ + Z γ   and 
(3)            
2
70 ´70 70 70 ,N ( 0 , ) , ii i i i i ra X Z ξ ωχ θ θ τ =+ ++    
where yit is GDP per capita in country i for year t, σi is the standard deviation for country i of the 
innovation terms εit, Xi70 are the controls for country i in 1970, ri70 is mineral resource exports 
(dependence) for country i, and ai70 measures resource reserves (abundance). Equation (1) 
explains growth, (2) explains volatility of unanticipated output growth, and (3) is the first-stage 
regression for resource dependence, where  70 ˆ i r  indicates the predicted instrumented values. We 
suppose average volatility σi is constant over time, but differs depending on the initial country 
characteristics captured in Zi70. We also allow for direct effects of these variables on growth (β). 
We suppose error terms are uncorrelated across countries, but allow for correlation of errors 
within countries over time. The parameters λ, μ, ν, c and vectors θ, β, γ , ω and χ are supposed 
to be constant across countries. We estimate these coefficients by maximizing the corresponding 
log-likelihood function.   
We extend van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) by instrumenting resource exports. The 
traditional view ignores the volatility channel and interprets a significant negative estimate of μ 
as evidence for the natural resource curse. Our evidence presented in table 1 based on BB 
suggests, in fact, that μ is insignificantly different from zero and possibly even positive, which 
undermines the case for the traditional resource curse. However, the total effect of resource 




it i i yrμ λνσ ∂Δ ∂ = + Hence, if 16 
 
resource dependence exerts a positive influence on volatility (positive ν) and volatility exerts a 
negative influence on growth in unanticipated output (negative λ), there may be a resource curse 
even if μ is positive provided that λ,ν and σi are big enough. Another way of saying this is that if 
a positive direct effect of resources on growth (μ) is cancelled by the indirect negative effect via 
volatility (λνσi/2), one could erroneously conclude from table 1 there is no effect of resources on 
growth. Note that our specification implies that a curse is more likely to occur in more volatile 
countries. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions are reported in table 2. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  regression 5  regression 6 
Variable  mean sd mean sd
d_gdppc  0.016 0.046 0.015 0.046
invgdp70  0.202 0.133
invgdp7003  0.169 0.070
gpop7003  0.017 0.010 0.017 0.010
log_gdppc70  8.418 0.947 8.361 0.947
human70  4.238 2.753 4.102 2.673
volatility  0.039 0.021 0.040 0.020
findev70  0.298 0.231 0.292 0.227
open70  0.386 0.487 0.341 0.474










Panama,  Paraguay*,  Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa*, Spain,  Sri Lanka, Sweden,  Switzerland, Syrian Arab  Republic*, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda*, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia. 
 
Natural resource export intensity enters both X and Z, but we assume it is endogenous and 
instrument it with reserves in 1970. Table 3 therefore reports a first stage with lallminpc as the 
excluded instrument.
20 We did not use the presidential dummy as instrument, since it had no 
predictive power for resource exports. Omitting it improves the first stage F-statistics even 




Table 3: IV estimates for the effect of natural resources on volatility and growth 
dependent variable: d_gdppc  (5) (6)




ld_gdppc ‐ 0.020  0.224*** ‐ 0.020  0.230*** 
  (0.033)  (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.028) 
invgdp70  0.392** ‐ 0.032**
  (0.150)  (0.016)
invgdp7003     0.362**  0.057** 
     (0.181)  (0.026) 
gpop7003 ‐ 3.070 ‐ 0.517*** ‐ 0.678 ‐ 0.345** 
  (3.496)  (0.152) (1.656) (0.148)
lgdppc70  0.025 ‐ 0.020*** 0.014 ‐0.011***
  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.017)  (0.002) 
human70 ‐ 0.014*  0.003*** ‐ 0.006  0.001** 
  (0.007)  (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Volatility (σi)  0.769  ‐1.208** 1.798*** ‐0.394**
  (1.182)  (0.471) (0.508) (0.187)
findev70 ‐ 0.059 ‐ 0.014* ‐ 0.046 ‐ 0.007 
  (0.045)  (0.008)  (0.028)  (0.005) 
open70 ‐ 0.058* ‐ 0.004 ‐0.033 0.001









Resource dependence (diffuse)  0.139  1.085** ‐0.148 5.320***
  (0.173)  (0.486) (0.145) (0.584)
findev70   ‐ 1.645***   ‐ 0.532*** 
   (0.085)   (0.115) 
open70   ‐ 0.717***   ‐ 0.652*** 
   (0.176) (0.151)
distcr  0.000  0.001*** 0.000 0.000**
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant ‐ 0.044 ‐ 6.126*** ‐ 0.074 ‐ 7.382*** 
  (0.160)  (0.035)  (0.149)  (0.040) 
Observations  2016  2016 2282 2282
Countries  60  60 68 68
year dummies in mean eq.  yes  yes  yes  yes 
R‐squared  0.514  .  0.548  . 






However, from previous regressions we feel confident that reserves are exogenous. We also 
exclude rule of law in 1984 because it was never significant and limits the sample. Instead we 
use openness in 1970 (open70) and financial development (private credit as percentage of GDP, 
findev70). We also control for one lag of per capita GDP growth (ld_gdppc) and barriers to trade 
(distance to the nearest coast or navigable river, distcr) and initial investment intensity 
(invgdp70). We distinguish between point-source resources (such as metals, natpoint70) and 
diffuse resources (such as agriculture, natnonpoint70). Also openness and financial development 
may have direct and indirect effects. 
The diagnostic statistics of regression 5 are favorable and we find significant positive 
effects of resource exports on growth at the 1% significance level. However, we also find that 
volatility affects growth negatively, which itself is heavily increased by dependence on natural 
resource exports! Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) show that the indirect effect through 
volatility is more robust than the direct effect. In regressions 6 we use averages over time for 
resource and investment intensity instead of initial levels.
21 The direct positive effect of exported 
raw mineral and fuel resources becomes insignificant and the net effect of resource dependence 
predicts a negative effect of resource on growth. The idea is that volatile swings of world 
resource prices translate into severe shocks to GDP in countries that depend on natural resource 
exports. We use regression 6 to calculate  70 log( )/ 0.057 0.394 11.803 /2, it i i yr σ ∂Δ∂ = − × × so there is 
a resource curse for countries with growth volatility above 2.45%.
22 This is the case for say 





22 Similarly, for average variable values, a one standard deviation increase in resource dependence (7.5%) has a 
direct positive effect of 0.43%-points additional growth, but also decreases annual growth by 0.7%-points.  
23 Out of 68 countries in the sample of regression (6), only 20 (mostly OECD countries) have growth volatility 
below 2.45%.  19 
 
average about 15% point-source resource dependence between 1970 and 2003.  We thus believe 
that an indirect curse exists, through volatility. For countries that are relatively stable, natural 
resource dependence may be a blessing rather than a curse. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The natural resource curse has rarely been questioned. BB therefore deserve credit for 
questioning the exogeneity of natural resource dependence and therefore questioning the validity 
of the curse itself. They find that, once resource dependence is instrumented with natural 
resource abundance, the curse as popularized by Sachs and Warner (1997) turns out to be a “red 
herring”; resource dependence has no significant effect on growth. Our comments on BB are 
directed at a better understanding of the data used to measure subsoil assets, the econometric 
methodology, and the specification of the resource curse. 
Care is needed in using World Bank (1997, 2006a) estimates of the value of natural 
resources in cross-country and panel studies, since these data use the same social discount rate of 
4 percent per annum regardless of whether a country grows fast or slow, and the same remaining 
lifetime of 20 years and the same elasticity of the cost of extraction regardless of the type of 
resource, the country concerned and the date. Furthermore, they over-estimate marginal 
extraction costs and under-estimate resource rents and reserves and they do not allow for 
monopoly power on the resource market. The rents data are based on dated estimates of the cost 
function for Malaysian oil fields. The measures of subsoil wealth are endogenous, since they are 
a multiple of endogenous resource rents. Hence, the econometric tests using these data reported 
in BB can be criticized as subsoil wealth cannot be used as an instrument for resource exports. 20 
 
This is why we focus on the specifications that use fuel and non-fuel mineral per-capita stocks 
from Norman (2009), which is a more exogenous measure of resource abundance. 
We improve on the econometric methodology of Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008ab) by 
using GDP based on constant rather than current international dollars, introducing omitted 
variables such as schooling, investment and population growth in the growth equation, excluding 
institutional quality and openness as instruments as they are potential determinants of growth, 
including all other exogenous variables in the set of instruments, and also using the latest version 
of the Penn World Tables. We concur with BB that there is no evidence for a traditional resource 
curse and there may even be a small positive direct effect of resource dependence on growth. 
However, this may be due to the fact that the direct positive effect on growth of the level of 
resource dependence and the indirect negative effect via volatility more or less wipe each other 
out. If we instrument resource dependence with resource abundance and use the data of this 
comment, we indeed find in line with van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) evidence for this. This 
suggests that the total effect of resource dependence on growth is negative in highly volatile 
countries and positive in stable countries, so that the quintessence of the resource curse appears 
to be the notorious volatility of commodity prices. 
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Appendix 1: Extraction costs and sustainability of natural resources 
We sketch the ingenious arguments of Vincent (1997). The Hartwick rule ensures that a country sustains 
a constant level of consumption by maintaining a constant broad stock of capital, including physical, 
human, and natural resource capital, and environmental quality. Hartwick (1977, 1990) shows that a 
country then needs to deplete its non-renewable resource at a rate equal to the Hotelling rents π(t)q(t), 
where q(t) denotes the level of natural resource production, unit rents are defined by π(t)≡p(t)−c′(q(t)) and 
c(q(t)) denotes the cost function for producing natural resources, all at time t. Unit rents are the exogenous 
price of natural resources minus marginal extraction cost. The required rate of depletion is thus less than 
resource rents p(t)q(t)−c(q(t)). When resource extraction begins, marginal rent is low and Hotelling rents 
are low compared to total rents. As extraction continues, the logic of the Hotelling rule demands that 23 
 
marginal rents rise and thus that Hotelling rents grow more in line with rents. Just before the resource is 
exhausted, Hotelling rents reach rents. Hartwick and Hagemann (1993) suggest a sinking-fund 
interpretation: investing the Hotelling rents in an interest-bearing account each year implies that, by the 
time the well or mine reaches exhaustion, there are sufficient funds to buy an equally valuable well or 
mine and sustain business. Over time, a growing proportion of resource rents need to be invested in the 
sinking fund as the time that is available to earn interest before exhaustion shrinks. If each period actual 
rents rather than Hotelling rents are consumed, the economy is unable to sustain constant consumption. 
Since data on marginal extraction costs and Hotelling rents are unavailable, Vincent (1997) 
obtains Hotelling rents by using estimates of the elasticity of the marginal cost curve and the number of 
years before the well or mine is exhausted. He adopts an aggregate approach for a wide range of minerals 
in Malaysia produced at hundreds of sites with varying resource quality and extraction costs. Suppose 
extraction costs for producing q(t) barrels, m3s or tons of the resource are c(q(t)) = Ξ q(t)
ε with ε > 1 to 
ensure c″(q(t)) > 0. Since at the time of exhaustion T marginal cost ε Ξ q(T)
ε−1 must equal average cost of 
extraction Ξ q(T)
ε−1 in an optimal program, we have q(T)=0 and marginal rents at time T  equal p. Vincent 
(1997) applies Hotelling’s (1931) rule, namely that growth of marginal rents equals the rate of discount, 
to get marginal rent at terminal date T as p = [p − c′(q(t))] (1+r)
T−t and thus marginal extraction cost at 
time t equals: 
 
(A1)       c′(q(t)) = p [1 − (1+r)
−(T−t)]  and  c(q(t)) = c′(q(t))q(t)/ε.  
 
This expression is not quite correct, since it erroneously assumes that resource production levels are 
constant for the remaining life of the resource (i.e., assumes q(s)=q(t) for t ≤ s < T and q(T) = 0) whereas 
the Hotelling rule suggests that resource production levels and marginal extraction costs gradually 
diminish over the life of the resource until they become zero at the date of exhaustion. Correct application 
of Hotelling’s rule gives the permanent value of marginal extraction costs at time t as: 
 
(A1′)      
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The erroneous assumption used in Vincent (1997) and World Bank (2006a) thus leads to an over-estimate 
of current marginal costs of extraction and an under-estimate of resource rents. Working with the 
approximation of Vincent (2007) and making use of (A1), we see that the ratio of Hotelling rents to rents 
can be written as: 
(A2)          
()
1( )
() ( ) / ( ) 1
() c ' ( () ) () () ( 1 )
()
() c ( () ) () ()1 ( 1 )
1,
1( 1 ) ( 1 ) 1( 1 ) ( 1 )
Tt
Tt
Tt S tq t
pq t q t q t pq t r
t










− ⎡ ⎤ −− + ⎣ ⎦
≅≤




where S(t) is the stock of in-situ reserves time t and S(t)/q(t)−1 a proxy for the remaining years of the 
resource. Note that Θ(T) = 1. The value of ε chosen by Vincent (1997) is 1.15, which comes from the 
development cost function for Malaysian oil fields reported in World Bank (1992). 
Total development costs corresponding to an oil field of size Z equals cD(Z) = 40 Z
0.85, so the 
development costs of a marginal field are cD′(Z) = 34 Z
−0.15 and decline with the size of an oil field. If 
largest fields are put into production first, increases in production are associated with declining marginal 
field size and thus rising marginal development costs. Since operating costs do not vary with field size, 
the overall marginal cost elasticity equals the marginal development cost elasticity: 
 
(A3)   ε−1 = [dcD′(Z)/dZ] (dZ/dq) [q/cD′(Z)] = −0.15 (dZ/dq) q/Z = 0.15  and  ε = 1.15, 
 
where Z is inversely proportional to q to capture that the number of large fields is smaller than the number 
of smaller fields. It follows from (A2), Hotelling’s rule (marginal unit rents, p − c′(q(t)) must grow at the 
rate of discount), and the approximation ln(1+r) ≅ r that unit rents π(t) ≡ p − c(q(t))/q(t) = Θ(t) [p − 
c′(q(t)] must grow at the rate that is used in the calculations of natural capital in World Bank (2006a): 
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Appendix 2: Description of data 
  Data taken from Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008)    
minxp7080s  GDP share of total yearly mineral exports, defined as the 
sum of fuel minerals, ores and metal exports, averaged 
over 1970–1989. Fuels comprise SITC section 3 (fuel 
minerals); ores and metals comprise the commodities in 
SITC sections 27 (crude fertilizer, minerals not elsewhere 






lsubsoil_1994  Ln of subsoil assets, estimated in US$ per capita. The 
measures include energy resources (oil, natural gas, hard 
coal, lignite) and other mineral resources (bauxite, copper, 
iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc). Based on rents 
averaged between 1990 and 1994. T=20 only for those 
resources where reserves data was not available. Does not 
include gold and silver. 
World Bank (1997)
lsubsoil_2000  as in lsubsoil_1994, but includes gold and silver and refers 
to year 2000 only. T=20 for all resources and countries. 
World Bank 
(2006a) 
Lallminpc  Ln of fuel and 35 non-fuel mineral stocks estimated for 
1970 at market prices, in US$ per capita. 
Norman (2009) 
Latitude  Absolute value of latitude of a country on a scale of 0–1.  La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
open5060s  Measure of trade openness (in nominal terms), defined as 
the sum of imports and exports over GDP. Average 
between 1950 and 1969. 
PWT 6.1 25 
 
pres70s  Binary indicator for form of government, coded 1 if the 
chief executive is directly presidential or a strong 
president elected by an assembly. Coded 0 if 
parliamentary. Value for early 1970s. 
Beck et al. (2005), 
Persson and 
Tabellini (2004) 
rule 1996  Measures quality of contract enforcement, police and 
courts, and likelihood of crime and violence in 1996. 
Calibrated with values between 0 (worst) and 5 (best). 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2005) 
 Additional  data   
g7000  Ln difference of real GDP per capita between 1970 and 
2000, in constant international dollars (1996 for PWT 6.1, 
and 2000 for PWT 6.2). 
PWT 6.1 and 6.2 
(rgdpch) 
lgdp70  Ln of real GDP per capita in 1970, in constant 
international dollars (1996 for PWT 6.1, and 2000 for 
PWT 6.2). 
PWT 6.1 and 6.2 
(rgdpch) 
Gpop  Ln difference in total population. Averages are taken by 
country across the given period 
PWT 6.1 and 6.2 
Human  Average schooling years in the population (age 25+)  Barro & Lee(2000)
Invgdp  Gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP. Averages are 
taken by country across the given period 
PWT 6.1 and 6.2 
Natpoint  F.o.b. value of exported fuels + ores & metals as  




rule 1984  Country's score on law and order index in 1984 (first year 
available) 
PRS Group (2006)
  Additional data for table 3   
d_gdppc  Annual ln difference in real GDP per capita, Laspeyres  PWT 6.1 and 6.2 
ld_gdppc  One year lag of annual ln difference in real GDP per 
capita, Laspeyres 
idem 
open  dummy: open to trade = 1  Wacziarg and 
Welch (2008) 





findev  Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  World Bank (2006)
natnonpoint  idem, but foods and agricultural raw materials. Averages 
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